Comprehensive Planning Components
The comprehensive plan "serves as an overall set of goals, objectives, and policies to guide" the local legislative body in its decision making in regard to the physical development of the community. Such plans often serve as the 14 "rational basis" upon which comprehensive zoning decisions are grounded. 15 Depending upon the particular requirements of a jurisdiction, a comprehensive plan may or may not be adopted as law by the local government. The State of Florida, for instance, enacted the Local Government Comprehensive Planning and Land Development Act of 1985 (codified at Chapter 163, Florida Statutes). It requires local governments to adopt and amend existing plans for consistency with the State and Regional plans. Failure to do so will result in loss of state revenue-sharing to local governments and loss of grant money controlled by the state government. Pennsylvania recently moved in a similar 16 direction by amending its growth management legislation to require "state agencies to consider and rely upon comprehensive plans . . . when making infrastructure decisions that impact land use." The four defining components 17 of a comprehensive plan include its future-orientation, its continuity, its basis upon present and projected conditions, and its focus on equity. [o] ne of the more important factors the court considers in determining the reasonableness of a proposed [zoning change] is whether the community has given care and consideration to the use and development of the land. The existence of a comprehensive plan indicates the community has given careful consideration to the orderly utilization of the property within its borders."); Kozesnik v. Montgomery Twp., 131 A.2d 1, 7-8 (N.J. 1957) (arising prior to the enactment of N.J. Stat. Ann. § 40:55D-62 which now requires the enactment of certain elements of a formal comprehensive plan by local governments); Udell v. Haas, 235 N.E.2d 897, 900-01 (N.Y. 1968) (holding that " [t] he comprehensive plan is the essence of zoning. Without it, there can be no rational allocation of land use. It is the insurance that the public welfare is being served and that zoning does not become nothing more than just a Gallup poll.").
Current Role of Comprehensive Planning
The majority of states do not mandate the adoption of comprehensive plans by local governments. The non-regulatory status of comprehensive 19 planning derives mainly from the 1920s standard planning and zoning legislation promulgated by the Department of Commerce. As Julian 20 Juergensmeyer and Thomas Roberts explain:
The Standard State Zoning Enabling Act required that zoning regulations and zoning decisions be made "in accordance with the comprehensive plan," but failed to address the obvious question of what a comprehensive plan was. Later, the Standard City Planning Enabling Act of 1928, while boldly setting forth the suggested "elements" of comprehensive plans, and the manner in which a city might prepare and adopt them, failed to strictly define the legal relationship between plans and zoning ordinances. In addition, plans were optional under the Standard City Planning Enabling Act. 21 As most jurisdictions went no further than adopting the language of the model acts in defining the relationship between comprehensive planning and comprehensive zoning, the duty to define this relationship fell to the courts. 22 
Comprehensive Zoning Components
Comprehensive zoning, as contrasted with comprehensive planning, is the "division of a municipality (or other governmental unit) into districts, and the regulation within those districts of: (i) the height and bulk of building and other structures; (ii) the area of a lot which may be occupied and the size of required open spaces; (iii) the density of population; and (iv) the use of 23 . URBAN PLANNING, supra note 11, at 403 (referring to the definition of comprehensive zoning used by the U.S. Department of Commerce in the 1924 Standard Zoning Enabling Act, on which most current legislation is based).
24. According to Goodman and Freund:
Zoning is essentially a means of insuring that the land uses of a community are properly situated in relation to one another, providing adequate space for each type of development. It allows the control of development density in each area so that property can be adequately serviced by such governmental facilities as the street, school, recreation, and utilities systems. This directs new growth into appropriate areas and protects existing property by requiring that development afford adequate light, air and privacy for person living and working within the municipality. 
Current Role of Comprehensive Zoning
Comprehensive zoning remains the core tool of land-use regulation.
27
While the essence of comprehensive zoning (i.e., the division of a municipality into districts) has remained fundamentally unchanged, the adoption of new control techniques within zoning regimes has significantly altered comprehensive zoning from its original form.
28
Comprehensive zoning is distinguished from the exercise of other municipal powers because the zoning regulations differ from district to district. Building common law), have developed general limitations on the exercise of zoning authority. These limitations include the following general requirements: 32 (i) regulations within a district must be uniform for each class of building, (ii) there must be a reasonable basis for classifying particular areas, (iii) the ordinance must cover the entire jurisdiction of the municipality, and (iv) the regulations must be reasonable in their application to particular properties. 
Consistency Between Comprehensive Planning and Comprehensive Zoning
The confusion mentioned earlier regarding comprehensive planning and comprehensive zoning arises mainly from the adoption of comprehensive zoning regulations by municipalities that fail to also adopt comprehensive planning regulations. Comprehensive zoning, in theory, is intended only to 34 be one of several administrative tools available to municipalities to carry out a comprehensive plan. A municipality is not required to regulate land use, but if it decides to implement zoning, it must have a well-articulated statement of community development objectives. Objectives should be supported by sufficient analysis and documentation to defend the zoning or other land use ordinances of the community against legal challenges. Preparing a comprehensive plan provides the most effective basis for the development of land use ordinances.
37
Implicit in the last sentence is the notion that there are other bases from which to defend comprehensive zoning or other land-use regulations. This statement is certainly placing the functions of the comprehensive plan and comprehensive zoning in correct relation to one another. It still, however, allows comprehensive zoning legislation to be sufficient in and of itself.
II. AFFORDABLE HOUSING GENERALLY

A. Defining Affordable Housing
Affordable housing is defined by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development as housing that costs (including rent, utilities, property taxes, and insurance) less than 30 percent of a household's total income.
38
Households that pay more than this amount are considered "housing burdened," and consequently will be able to afford less of other necessities such as food, clothing, transportation, and health care. Nationally, more than 39 12 million households pay more than 50 percent of their annual income for housing costs. More disturbing, perhaps, is the data showing that a family 40 with one full-time worker earning the minimum wage cannot afford the local fair-market rent for a two-bedroom apartment anywhere in the United States.
41
Two trends have effectively driven the affordable housing dilemma in the United States. First, wages and income have not kept pace with the ever increasing costs of daily living such as transportation, health insurance, child care, and housing. Second, the availability of affordable housing units has 42 continually decreased.
43
B. The Current Housing-Wage
To illustrate the severity of this country's affordable housing condition, commentators frequently use a number referred to as the "housing wage." 45. See NLIHC, supra note 43, at 4. 46. "FMRs are gross rent estimates. They include the shelter rent plus the cost of all tenant-paid utilities, except telephones, cable or satellite television service, and internet service. HUD sets FMRs to assure that a sufficient supply of rental housing is available to program participants. To accomplish this objective, FMRs must be both high enough to permit a selection of units and neighborhoods and low enough to serve as many low-income families as possible. The level at which FMRs are set is expressed as a percentile point within the rent distribution of standard-quality rental housing units. Market Rental for a two-bedroom apartment, she must work 108 hours a week or be a part of a household that includes 2.7 minimum-wage workers.
C. The Role of Affordable Housing in a Community
The lack of affordable housing within a municipality leads to several notable consequences, including the lack of a balanced workforce, the lack of businesses, the lack of economic stimulus, overcrowding of existing housing, the provision of second-rate municipal services to these residents, fewer educational opportunities, and increased unemployment. As John R. Nolon There is a close relationship between the public welfare and an adequate stock of affordable housing. Without affordable housing, the balanced work force needed to attract and retain commercial and industrial development will not exist. Without business development, the community will not enjoy the benefits of a diversified tax base. A diversified tax base eases the pressures on residential taxpayers, creates stability for the municipal corporation, and helps the community weather economic changes. The development of affordable housing for the young and old, for people of low and middle income, breathes fairness into the development pattern of a locality, and provides living accommodations for all segments of the population. This diversified housing stock creates a heterogeneous population and economy and an equitable distribution of housing opportunity, thereby furthering the objectives of comprehensive planning. 66 John A. Powell argues that a lack of affordable housing lessens a community's opportunity to provide access to wealth, employment, transportation, childcare, education, health, and democratic participation. In 67 essence, Powell's argument makes access to affordable housing a key requirement for access to these other opportunities. Describing affordable 68 housing's relationship with employment and transportation, Powell finds that: [W] here people live in the metropolitan region plays a significant role in their employment prospects . . . . Because long distances and traveling time restrain the ability of people to gain and keep jobs, people tend to choose housing or to relocate in proximity to employment sites. This is true when there is a choice in housing, but when affordable housing is not present near job growth, this choice dissolves.
69
This spatial mismatch, in turn, affects the employment and earnings of the affordable housing population. 70 
D. Economic Impediments to the Construction of Affordable Housing
Professors Glaeser and Gyourko, writing for the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, respond to the general outcry of an affordable housing crisis by sharply dissecting the issue into two, separate components-the cost of housing and the level of poverty. This dissection is crucial, according to 71 Glaeser and Gyourko, because a governmental response comprised of increasing housing supply to address the issue of poverty is inapposite and therefore ineffective. An affordable housing crisis, according to Glaeser and 72 Gyourko, means that the cost of housing is expensive relative to its cost of production; not that people are poor. Concomitantly, Glaeser and Gyourko 73 argue that the ability to pay for housing is an inaccurate benchmark for measuring affordability. Instead, the physical construction costs of housing 74 should be used as the benchmark. housing crisis, the correct response is to increase the supply of housing. As the social cost of constructing this housing cannot be less than the cost of constructing the increase in the supply of housing, increasing the housing supply will ultimately lead to social costs rather than social gains.
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Using 2000 Census data and construction cost data from R.S. Means, Glaeser and Gyourko found that generally, the price of existing housing is close to the cost of new construction. Analyzing housing data from different 77 parts of the United States, Glaeser and Gyourko employed an empirical analysis and concluded that America does not uniformly face an affordable housing crisis. Instead, as the "housing wage" across the country evidences, 78 America is more likely facing a poverty crises. This research raises two important points that local governments and proponents of government-subsidized affordable housing must recognize. First, most government programs that address the supply of housing will have a social cost, usually measurable as the difference between the market rate of new construction and the selling price of the units. Second, land use regulations do place artificial limitations on the supply of land. As discussed in further detail below, any type of zoning regulation places artificial limits 83 on the supply of land and thus increases the cost of land. As the cost of land constitutes approximately 20 percent of the cost of housing, the impact of land potentially leaves local governments in an uncomfortable position-the solution sought by local governments may, in fact, be the source of the problem.
A corollary concern municipal governments must also be cognizant of is that "[d]evelopers and home buyers unwilling to abide by land use or housing policies in one place will take their development elsewhere." All of these 85 considerations consequently coalesce to make the resolution to the affordable housing problem, assuming there is one, a much more complicated issue.
E. Legal Mechanisms Available to Provide Affordable Housing
Exclusionary Zoning
During the proceedings leading to the initial validation of comprehensive zoning ordinances, both the arguments for and the arguments against allowing local governments to control private development were thoroughly documented. Those arguing against the constitutionality of these ordinances contended that such power, when exercised on residential housing, would lead to local governments classifying "the population and segregat[ing] them according to their income and station in life." Countering this argument was 86 the position that zoning could and would be used simply as a good housekeeping mechanism-segregating property uses that would have detrimental effects to the community if it was not segregated. The benefits 87 of such zoning, so the argument goes, include the prevention of conflicting land uses, the protection of property values, and the minimization of problems associated with overcrowding and urbanization. This practice of excluding 88 land uses from segments of a community is commonly referred to as "exclusionary zoning," and may be driven by a wide range of motives. 89 produce high tax revenues [e.g., luxury condominiums] rather than high density, low-cost housing. Other motives, such as the retention of open space, the preservation of property values, or the preservation of the character of neighborhoods also exist. See JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 7, at 230.
90. Orfield, supra note 85, at 888 (noting that when the only type of development permitted is associated with high-cost housing, the "siting and production [of affordable housing] becomes nearly impossible").
91. Exclusion of lower cost housing from a community leads to the higher cost of housing, the promotion of urban sprawl, the increase in costs of providing municipal services, and an increased burden upon the urban poor. Whatever the local government's motive, such zoning techniques are viewed by some commentators as "the most common legal impediment to affordable housing." Other commentators believe that exclusionary zoning 90 invariably brings with it other detrimental consequences. Local governments 91 utilize many different mechanisms to effect these land-use exclusions, including "regulations mandating a minimum lot size and minimum house size, large lot-frontage requirements, and limitations or bans on multi-family housing and manufactured housing." Land use controls such as these, which 92 prescribe "substantial minimum floor area or lot size for residential dwellings," effectively raise the price of residential access to a zone. These 93 exclusionary regulations are generally implemented through zoning and subdivision controls, as these are the primary land use controls available to exclude unwanted uses. 94 Challenging these apparently exclusionary ordinances is one legal mechanism through which exclusionary zoning ordinances can be eliminated. Landowners may challenge such ordinances either through state and local courts or through the curative amendment process. Equities, explained the operation of the test as follows:
These core principles [private property rights and the municipality's police power] inspired our decisions in a line of cases collectively embracing the following view: Where a municipal subdivision is a logical place for development to occur, it must assume its rightful part of the burdens associated with development, neither isolating itself nor ignoring the housing needs of the larger region. This philosophy finds concrete expression in the "fair share" principle, which this Court has adopted. It requires local political units to "plan for and provide land use regulations which meet the legitimate needs of all categories of people who may desire to live within its boundaries . . . ."
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The first two parts raise threshold inquiries focusing on a municipality's propensity for population growth and its capacity to accommodate additional development . . . . If a community is a logical area for development and its present level of development does not preclude further development, then it is necessary to conduct the third inquiry, which focuses on determining the exclusionary impact of the zoning ordinance.
101
The curative amendment process, an alternative to challenging apparently exclusionary ordinances in state and local courts, allows landowners to challenge local zoning ordinances by filing "curative amendments" directly to the municipality.
The ability to challenge such policies in a 102 municipality's zoning regulations outside of state and local judicial systems serves as a more effective weapon for proponents of affordable housing.
104. This is also commonly referred to as "inclusionary-housing laws. [a] housing element consisting of standards, plans, and principles to be followed in . . .
[t]he provision of adequate sites for future housing, including affordable workforce housing . . . , housing for low-income, very low-income, and moderate-income families, mobile homes, and group home facilities and foster care facilities, with supporting infrastructure and public facilities.
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To give this comprehensive planning element some "teeth," the State of Florida requires local comprehensive plans to be reviewed at least once every five years. If the local comprehensive plan is found to not be in compliance 114 with the elements in the Florida Growth Management Act, state funds can be withheld by the State from projects under the province of the local governments.
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One of the most vibrant areas of inclusionary-zoning activity is incentive zoning. This is, perhaps, due to the inclination of local-government officials toward inducing the relinquishment of private property rights rather than taking private property rights. Additionally, the lack of upfront, localgovernment funding for these incentives is extremely attractive to a local official seeking to retain her office. Moreover, as developers will likely be 116 deterred by the reduced profitability associated with the construction of affordable housing, local governments are forced to offer such incentives to ensure that affordable housing units are in fact produced.
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One of several mechanisms that fall under the umbrella of incentive zoning laws is the provision of zoning variances for developers of residential housing. In exchange for a set-aside of a prescribed percentage of affordable 118 housing units in new development, local governments relax some of the requirements of a zoning regulation to increase the intensity of proposed development above the prescribed standard. of zoning variances used for the construction of affordable housing, namely conditional rezoning of individual parcels and generic zoning.
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Conditional rezoning of individual parcels, in the context of creating affordable housing, usually arises when a developer seeks to increase the permitted zoning density of a particular parcel of land. By conditioning an 121 increase in allowable development density on the concession of a developer to construct units of affordable housing, local governments must be prepared to meet the stringent requirements of the Supreme Court's "nexus" jurisprudence. According to John R. Nolon, at least, "[w]hen the local 122 government, which could deny the request for rezoning, conditions the rezoning on the provision of some affordable housing for the specific purpose of furthering the comprehensive plan, the constitutionally required 'nexus' between the condition imposed and the burden created by the development is found."
123
Generic zoning for affordable housing offers two alternatives to the conditional zoning of individual parcels, namely special-use permits and floating zones. A special-use permit has been used successfully in several 124 jurisdictions to permit greater density of development as a bonus to a developer constructing affordable housing units for the elderly. 134. The California Coastal Commission granted a permit to the Nollans to replace a small bungalow on their beachfront lot with a larger house upon the condition that they allow the public an easement to pass across their beach, which was located between two public beaches. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 825. earned by the owner-occupier must be remitted to the county's Housing Initiative Fund. These remitted profits are then used to aid the future 129 development and rehabilitation of affordable housing. 130 Another mechanism used by local governments from the inclusionaryzoning toolkit is commonly referred to as mandatory set-asides. Essentially, a developer within a jurisdiction with such a mechanism must include a minimum number of affordable housing units within the market-priced housing units. Implementation of this mechanism raises constitutional [A] permit condition that serves the same legitimate police-power purpose as a refusal to issue the permit should not be found to be a taking if the refusal to issue the permit would not constitute a taking. . . . [T]he condition would be constitutional even if it consisted of the requirement that the [property owners] provide a viewing spot on their property for passersby with whose sighting of the ocean their new house would interfere . . . . The evident constitutional propriety disappears, however, if the condition substituted for the prohibition utterly fails to further the end advanced as the justification for the prohibition. When that essential nexus is eliminated, the situation becomes the same as if [the] law forbade shouting fire in a crowded theater, but granted dispensations to those willing to contribute $100 to the state treasury . . . . The purpose then becomes, quite simply, the obtaining of an easement to serve some valid governmental purpose, but without payment of compensation. Whatever may be the outer limits of "legitimate state 135 139. Brown, supra note 42, at 6-7 (explaining that the MDPU program requires that any new housing development of fifty or more units set aside twelve and one-half to fifteen percent of the units for households earning sixty-five percent or less of the area's median income. As compensation for building the mandated MPDUs, developers can receive a density bonus of up to twenty-two percent.).
140. This substantive change is likely beneficial for the survival of the regulation, as courts are much more friendly to incentive zoning regulations than mandatory set-asides. 
A. Pennsylvania Land Use Authority
As discussed above, the authority to manage the placement and timing of physical development within a community has been repeatedly held as a proper exercise of a state's police power. Historically, local governments, 147 acting as municipal corporations, were treated as "creatures of the state" to limit their power of initiative and assert the state's legislative preemptive power. Dillon's Rule, as adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court, is a 148 149
nineteenth century judicial rule of interpretation for decisions pertaining to municipal governance that encapsulates this understanding of the role of local government. Acknowledging that the incorporation of the municipality 150 impliedly provided some power (i.e., the power to administer local affairs), the formulation of Dillon's rule ensured that local governments did not exercise authority beyond those powers. Beginning in the late nineteenth century, a movement emerged to challenge the "creature of the state" vision for local governments that Dillon's Rule sought to perpetuate. This movement, known generally as the "Home 167. FOX, supra note 163, at 1.
Although the City of Pittsburgh is a home rule municipality within the protection of Pennsylvania's Home Rule Charter and Optional Plans Law, the City has limited home rule derived power to regulate the placement or timing of land development. The Home Rule Charter and Optional Plans Law 163 specifically curtail the powers of municipal governments to regulate the development of land to those contained in the Municipalities Planning Code of 1968-the express delegation of primary land-use control. As the City of 164 Pittsburgh is, in turn, not subject to the Municipalities Planning Code due to its status as a city of the second class, the City must derive its land-use 165 regulatory authority from its "original enabling legislation and any subsequent statutes applying to second class cities in particular or to municipalities in general and not in the MPC." Thus, the City derives its zoning authority 166 from Act No. 69 of 1927, its subdivision control from sections 9 through 12 of a separate 1927 Act, and its authority to adopt an official map from sections 5 through 8 and 14 through 20 of the same, separate Act. Consequently, the 167 City of Pittsburgh can still be categorized as a "creature of the state" and therefore must derive its land use authority from the second-class city enabling act.
Philadelphia, on the other hand, has a Home Rule Charter (the "Charter") that gives the City "all powers and authority of local self-government" and "complete powers of legislation and administration in relation to its municipal functions," as well as "the power to enact ordinances and to make rules and exercising this general grant of authority, the City is empowered to create and enforce zoning ordinances to provide an orderly method and plan of development. 169 The result is that Pennsylvania has three separate legislative regimes under which land use controls are adopted. First, the vast majority of municipalities derive their authority from Pennsylvania's Municipalities Planning Code. Second, the City of Pittsburgh derives its authority from the second-class city legislation. Third, the City of Philadelphia derives its 170 authority from its Charter. The remainder of this article will attempt to 171 analyze the efficacy of the aforementioned legislative regimes in creating affordable housing in Pennsylvania.
B. Exclusionary Zoning
As mentioned above, the curative amendment process allows landowners to challenge local zoning ordinances by filing "curative amendments" directly to the municipality rather than substantively challenging the ordinances in state and local courts, allowing for a more effective weapon for proponents 172 of affordable housing. As explained in detail, below, only Pennsylvania's 173 Municipalities Planning Code provides for a curative amendment process. Consequently, municipalities operating under this legislative regime are, at least theoretically, in a better position to challenge the deleterious effects of exclusionary zoning on the creation of affordable housing.
Philadelphia's Home Rule Charter
Section 14-1708 of Philadelphia's Municipal Code provides that the enactment and amendment of zoning ordinances will follow, essentially, the procedures set out in the Charter. The Charter, in turn, provides that "[t]he City Planning Commission shall prepare proposed zoning ordinances, which may embody regulations and maps, and amendments thereto, and submit such proposed zoning ordinances and amendments thereto to the Mayor for 
Second-Class City Legislation
Pennsylvania's second-class city legislation is contained in Sections  22101 For the purpose of promoting health, safety, morals or the general welfare of the community, cities of the second class are hereby empowered to regulate, restrict or determine, the height, number of stories and size of buildings and other structures, the percentage of lot that may be built upon, the size of yards, courts and other open spaces, the density of population, and the location, use and occupancy of buildings, structures and land for trade, industry, residence or other purposes.
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To effect this general mandate, cities of the second class are charged to divide themselves into districts and to regulate within such districts the "erection, construction, reconstruction, alteration, repair, use, or occupancy of buildings, structures, or land."
A city planning commission is authorized to 185 recommend the boundaries of these districts and the regulations to be 186 187 enforced within each district. Ultimately, the council of each second-class 188 city must provide for the manner "in which such regulations and restrictions and the boundaries of such districts shall be determined, established and enforced, and, from time to time, amended, supplemented or changed."
189 Section 25057 provides a properly appointed board of adjustment the authority to, "in appropriate cases and subject to appropriate conditions and safeguards, make special exceptions to the terms of the ordinance, in harmony with its general purpose and intent and in accordance with general or specific rules therein contained." This board of adjustment is given the power to Specifically, if the board of adjustment finds in favor of the zoning administrator and against a landowner, she must challenge the zoning ordinance in Pennsylvania's courts. The board of adjustment must abuse its 193 discretion to have its decision overturned. 194 
Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code
In contrast to Philadelphia's Charter and Pennsylvania's second class city legislation, the MPC provides landowners with a curative amendment 195 process through the following language:
A landowner who desires to challenge on substantive grounds the validity of a zoning ordinance . . . , which prohibits or restricts the use or development of land in which he has an interest may submit a curative amendment to the governing body with a written request that his challenge and proposed amendment be heard and decided . . . . 196 If the challenge to the current zoning regulation has merit, the governing body may either (i) accept the amendment, with or without revision, or (ii) adopt an alternative amendment fashioned to address the defects of the zoning ordinance being challenged. Among the several considerations a governing 197 body must take into account in deciding whether to accept a landowner's curative amendment is, "if the proposal is for a residential use, the impact of the proposal upon regional housing needs and the effectiveness of the proposal in providing housing units of a type actually available to and affordable by classes of person otherwise unlawfully excluded by the challenged provision . . . ." If the governing body does not find merit in the challenge, the 198 landowner may challenge the zoning ordinance in court.
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C. Zoning Appeals Legislation
Pennsylvania has not enacted legislation shifting the burden of proof to the municipality denying a permit to show that the affordable housing needs of the community are met. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in holding that the grant of a special exception to a municipality's zoning ordinance was valid, explained the standard for reversal is manifest abuse of discretion or an error of law by the municipality's board of adjustment. As Pennsylvania's 200 
Supreme Court explains in Blair v. Board of Adjustment:
A special exception is issued for an exceptional use which may be permitted within a particular district if the board of adjustment determines its availability. Such uses are made available as a privilege, not as of right, assuming that the requisite facts and conditions detailed in the ordinance are found to exist. Since its allowance is predicated on the exercise of prudent discretion by the Board, only a manifest abuse of that discretion will cause reversal on appeal. 201 The only significant difference between the denial of a special exception to a municipality's zoning ordinance and the denial of a conditional use is the jurisdiction in which it falls. As such, Pennsylvania courts treat the grant of 202 a conditional use in much the same way. As the construction of affordable 203 housing will likely give rise to the need for increased densities, and in turn 204 give rise to the need for special exceptions and conditional uses, the current state of the law in any of three legislative regimes is not particularly beneficial to the developers of affordable housing.
D. State Regulation of Comprehensive Planning
Municipalities with an adopted comprehensive plan and zoning ordinance located within a county with an adopted comprehensive plan have the benefit of Commonwealth agencies considering the documents when reviewing applications for the funding or permitting of municipal infrastructure or other facilities. Short of this marginal benefit, there is apparently no consequence 205 to not having a comprehensive plan as such. The three legislative regimes, as shown below, do not provide any further incentive to adopt a comprehensive plan.
Philadelphia's Home Rule Charter
Philadelphia's city council operates under its home rule charter, which vests legislative power of the city exclusively in council and provides it the right to adopt a comprehensive plan relating to zoning within the city. The 206 First Class City Home Rule Act of 1949 provides that zoning regulations:
[S]hall be made in accordance with a comprehensive plan, and designed to lessen congestion in the streets, to secure safety from fire, panic and other dangers, to promote health and the general welfare, to provide adequate light and air, to prevent the overcrowding of land, to avoid undue concentration of population, to facilitate the adequate provision of transportation, water, sewerage, schools, parks, and other public requirements. Such regulations shall be made with reasonable consideration, among other things, to the topography and character of the district, and its peculiar suitability for particular uses, with a view to conserving the value of buildings and encouraging the most appropriate use of land throughout such city. 207 Although this legislation mandates the City employ a comprehensive plan, Pennsylvania courts have not required local governments to adopt comprehensives plans, as such, to validate zoning ordinances. As a result, 208 unless Pennsylvania passes legislation that requires the adoption of a comprehensive plan, as such, this avenue is a dead end to Philadelphia in its efforts to create affordable housing.
Second-Class City Legislation
Pittsburgh's land use regulations are governed in part by the second class city legislation and in part by home rule principles. As such, Pennsylvania's 
Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code
The Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code deals much more in depth with the requirement of a comprehensive plan, as such. This This requirement has no teeth. To ensure that the comprehensive plan remains an impotent document, the Municipalities Planning Code provides that no action of the municipality's governing body will be invalid or subject to challenge based upon its inconsistency with such municipality's comprehensive plan. 
Philadelphia's Home Rule Charter
Philadelphia's Zoning Code contains an array of incentive zoning provisions, including ordinances aimed at the promotion of development that declared to be severable and separately conveyable from the estate in fee simple to which they are applicable"); id. § 10705(d) (providing for the standards of planned residential developments to "vary the density or intensity of land use, otherwise applicable to the land under the provisions of a zoning ordinance of the municipality within the planned residential development in consideration of . . . (3) the location, design, type and use of structures proposed").
IV. CONCLUSION
It is unclear whether America generally, and Pennsylvania in particular, has an affordable housing problem or a poverty problem. It is fairly clear, however, that the City of Philadelphia, the City of Pittsburgh, and all municipalities operating under Pennsylvania's Municipalities Planning Code currently have the authority to induce the construction of affordable housing through inclusionary zoning policies such as incentive zoning, mandatory setasides, and housing linkage fees. It is also fairly clear that residents of the City of Pittsburgh and the City of Philadelphia are at a disadvantage to municipalities operating under Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code when it comes to challenging exclusionary zoning ordinances.
